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Comment
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE ARMED SERVICESAN ANALYSIS OF RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING SEXUAL
PREFERENCE DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY
I.

INTRODUCrION

Probably in no area of employment has the homosexual individual'
been more rigidly, consistently, and harshly discriminated against than
in the United States Armed Forces.2 The invariable service response to
homosexuality is immediate discharge." Despite the fact that "homosexuality per se has no relationship to ability to perform good military
1. The homosexual individual is difficult to define because "homosexual[N]early
ity-heterosexuality is not necessarily an either-or proposition ....
half of American males [fall] somewhere between 'exclusively heterosexual'
. . . and 'exclusively homosexual'." A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HoMoFor a further explanation of what has been called
SEXUALTIEs 53 (1978).
the "heterosexual-homosexual continuum," see id. at 53-61; W. CHURCHILL,
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 36-59 (1971); F. KLEIN, THE BISEXUAL
OPTION 13-19 (1978).
The armed forces' regulations make no such fine distinctions. See note
3 infra. In this comment the term "homosexual" will be used to mean one
who comes under the armed forces' regulations.
2. See Note, Homosexuals in 'the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 476
(1969). One commentator has noted that, "(v]iewed in the context of the
historical development of the military regulations affecting homosexuals, current treatment is harsh." Id. See also Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges:
The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 799, 837 (1979).
2-103 (1972) [thereinafter
3. See, e.g., Air Force Regulation 39-12, § H,
cited as A.F.R.]. This typical regulation for many years stated in pertinent
part:
a. Homosexuality is not tolerated in the Air Force. Participation in
a homosexual act, or proposing or attempting to do so, is considered
serious misbehavior regardless of whether the role of a person in a
particular act was active or passive. Similarly, airmen who have
homosexual tendencies, or who associate habitually with persons known
to them to be homosexuals, do not meet Air Force standards. Members of the Air Force serving in the active military service represent
the military establishment 24 hours a day. There is no distinction
between duty time and off-duty time as the high moral standards of
the service must be maintained at all times.
b. It is the general policy to discharge members of the Air Force who
fall within the purview of this section. Exceptions to permit retention may be authorized only where the most unusual circumstances
exist and provided the airman's ability to perform military service has
not been compromised.
Id. This language remained in force until 1981, when new regulations seeking to maintain the same policy were issued. See notes 58 & 66 infra.

(351)
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service," 4 homosexuality has been consistently classified by the services
as per se disruptive behavior.5 Although the majority of the medical
and psychological community has long since abandoned this view,6 and
despite the fact that homosexuality is no longer a legally acceptable
reason for discharge of an employee in the civilian sector, 7 it is estimated
that between 2,000 and 3,000 individuals each year are discharged from
the armed forces in cases involving homosexuality. 8 Presumably these
figures would be even higher except for the fact that most homosexual
individuals in the armed services "remain undiscovered and complete
their service with honor." 9
In recent years, homosexual servicemembers have challenged the
military's policy of automatic discharge for non-standard sexual preferences as violative of the Constitution. 10 This trend paralleled the "gay
rights" movement which gained strength in civilian society in the late
1960's."1 This movement was characterized, in part, by an increased
willingness on the part of homosexuals to turn to the courts to protect
4. Note, supra note 2, at 473, citing Everhard, Problems Involving the Dis.
tosition of Homosexuals in the Service, 2 JAG. BULL. No. 6 at .20, 21 (1960).

For a summary of the statistical evidence confirming this statement, see C.
WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 60 (1971).
5. See, e.g., A.F.R. 36-2, 3(c)(1) (1977). This regulation states in pertinent
part:
Homosexuality is not tolerated in the Air Force. Participation
in a homosexual act, or proposing or attempting to do so, is considered serious misbehavior regardless of whether the role of a person
in a particular act was active or passive. Similarly, officers who have
homosexual tendencies, or who associate habitually with persons known
to them to be homosexuals, do not meet Air Force standards.
Id.

Similarly, A.F.R. 39-12 classifies homosexuality with such disruptive be-

haviors as alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and financial irresponsibility. A.F.R.
39-12, §§ I, 2-106, A, 2-4(c) (1972).
6. For a survey of 18 studies (including a study of men in the military)
which leads inescapably to this conclusion, see A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra
note 1, at 195-97.
One commentator has concluded that it is now "obvious that the freedom
of intimate association extends to homosexual associations as it does to heterosexual ones."

682 (1980).
evidence,

Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,

Another commentator, after an extensive survey of the scientific
concluded that "[t]he myth that homosexuality carries with it an

innate inability to perform fully in society is now quite thoroughly discredited."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944 n.17 (1978).
7. See 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 421:620. See also the Civil Service Commission's revised suitability guidelines, at note 13 infra.
8. See C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra note 4, at 45-53.
9. Id. at 60. Studies have indicated that 75% to 80% of all homosexual
servicemembers successfully complete their terms of service. Id.
10. For a concise history of this trend see generally Rivera, supra note 2,
at 837-55. Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REv.
311 (1980).
11. See generally E. BOGGAN, M. HA-r, C. LIsTER g.J. Rupp, THE RIGHTS
OF GAY PEOPLE 5-6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as E. BOGGAN].

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss2/2

2

Deiter: Employment Discrimination in the Armed Services - An Analysis of

1981-82]

COMMENT

and establish rights in the area of employment. 12 One result of this
action was the promulgation by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) of
federal guidelines which proscribe discrimination based upon sexual
preference in federal public (civilian) employment. 13
Sociological data indicate that approximately thirty percent of
servicemembers can be classified as "homosexuals" under the armed
forces regulations. 14 This fact, coupled with the armed forces' manifest
intent to continue discrimination on the basis of sexual preference,' 5
indicates an inevitable increase in the volume and intensity of legal
confrontation, potentially hindering the effectiveness of the armed
services. 16 Sexual preference discrimination in the military is therefore
12. See generally Rivera, supra note 2, at 338.

13. The new guidelines provide "for applying the same standard in evaluating sexual conduct, whether heterosexual or homosexual." Levine, Legal
Rights of Homosexuals in Public Employment, 1978 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 455,

484 (1979) (emphasis in original). The revised suitability guidelines include
the following:
Court decisions require that persons not be disqualified from Federal
employment solely on the basis of homosexual conduct. The Com-

mission and agencies have been enjoined not to find a person unsuitable for Federal employment solely because that person is a homosexual or has engaged in homosexual acts. Based upon these court
decisions and [an] outstanding injunction, while a person may not
be found unsuitable based on unsubstantiated conclusions concerning
possible embarrassment to the Federal service, a person may be dis-

missed or found unsuitable for Federal employment where the evidence
establishes that such person's sexual conduct affects job fitness.
Id. at 484 n.231 (emphasis added), quoting Fed. Personnel Manual Supp. 731-1,
subch. 53-26(3)c.
14. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra note 4, at 58. This figure represents the incidence of homosexual behavior among males in the armed forces,
which were overwhelmingly male at the time the study was made.

Id.

Com-

parable figures for females in the armed forces do not seem to exist. Studies
indicate, however, that the incidence of homosexual activity in the female
population generally is 28%. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEEHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR

IN THE HUMAN FEMALE

452-54 (1953).

15. The services have litigated all known cases in which discharge has
been resisted by the homosexual servicemember, and have appealed adverse
rulings. See generally Rivera, supra note 2, at 841-55. In reviewing its policy
in response to adverse court rulings, the Defense Department has remained
uncompromising. Air Force Times, Feb. 2, 1981, at 4, col. 2.
16. The armed services do not have an active program to seek out and
discharge homosexuals; the discharges only occur when a servicemember's
homosexuality comes to the official attention of the service. Matlovich v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 856 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1978). If a substantial number of homosexual servicemembers assert their right to a particular sexual preference, and the services rigidly adhere to their discharge policy,
the armed services could be seriously weakened. For example, assume that
the 30% approximation of homosexuals in the armed services is accurate.
See text accompanying note 14 supra; C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra
note 4, at 58. If only one third of this group contemporaneously proclaimed
their sexual preference, then armed forces strength could be reduced by 10%
until those discharged could be replaced with properly trained personnel-a
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an area of vital importance for those concerned with the national defense, as well as those concerned with individual rights.
This comment will examine three cases decided in 1980 which
suggest that the armed services will no longer be permitted to classify
homosexuality as per se disruptive behavior when discharging nondisruptive homosexual servicemembers. 17 This comment will review
the recent history of the evolution of gay rights in the military and will
seek to analyze the decisions which purport to give guidance in this
important area.
1I.

BACKGROUND

In 1949, the Department of Defense (D.O.D.) instituted its policy
that "known homosexual individuals were military liabilities and security risks who must be eliminated." 18 Violations of this policy are
punishable under Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(U.C.M.J.) which prohibits sodomy.19 This basic policy was reaffirmed
by the D.O.D. in 1975,20 and is parroted by the regulations of the Army,
process which, for example, in the case of a fighter pilot, could take over 18
months.
17. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 23 F.E.P. Cases 1251
(D.D.C. 1980); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980); benShalom
v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
18. See Note, supra note 2, at 468. This was apparently a retreat from an
earlier liberalization of Army policy toward homosexuals in the post-war years.
Id. at 466-68. It has been suggested that the new, more repressive policy, was
a reaction to the United States Senate investigation of homosexuals in the
government. Id. at 468 n.31.
19. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1976). Article 125 is neutral as to sexual preference,
and may be used to prosecute homosexuals or heterosexuals of either sex for
many forms of non-standard sexual conduct. See id.; United States v. Harris,
8 M.J. 52 (C.M.A. 1979) (prosecution of soldier for engaging in consensual
cunnilingus with girlfriend). Violation of Article 125 is punishable by five
years at hard labor, dishonorable discharge, and total forfeiture of all pay and
allowances. 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 25-14 (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
M.C.M.].
20. In a policy directive on homosexuals in the armed forces, the D.O.D.
stated that:
Department of Defense policy requires prompt separation of homosexuals. The homosexual person is considered unsuitable for military
service and i3 not permitted to serve in the Armed Forces in any
capacity. His presence in a military unit would seriously impair discipline, good order, morale, and security. Further, the Department
of Defense has an obligation and responsibility to provide our young

men and women in the Armed Forces with the most wholesome and
healthful environment possible.

Those individuals who have established homosexual tendencies are
discharged administratively as unsuitable for military service. Persons
discharged under this purview receive either an honorable or general discharge depending on the quality of their previous military
service. Those persons who commit homosexual acts or acts of sexual

perversion, when established, may be discharged as unfit for military
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Navy and Air Force. 21
Despite the availability of court-martial jurisdiction, 22 the services
have relied almost exclusively on administrative discharge procedures
when discharging homosexual individuals from the service. 23 The
regulations of the three services concerning discharge have traditionally
been broader, allowing discharge actions to be initiated not only for
homosexual acts, but also for "homosexual tendencies, desire, or interest,
even if without overt homosexual acts." 24 However, administrative
discharges are subject to judicial review in the federal district courts or
25
the Court of Claims.
Until the mid-1970's, most persons who challenged their discharge
from the services under these regulations did not voluntarily admit their
service and may receive an undesirable discharge. In addition, specific
homosexual acts may be a violation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and, in many cases, the laws of various states.
The unique character of the military environment, both ashore
and at sea, precludes any possibility of their assimilation within a
military organization, under any conditions. Consequently, homosexual persons cannot be accepted into our Armed Forces and must be
promptly separated when so identified. Likewise, persons who are
found unsuitable for military service because of homosexual or other
aberrant tendencies are not accepted into or are discharged from military service, as appropriate.
This policy is considered to be absolutely essential to the effectiveness of our Armed Forces and to the morale and welfare of its members.
Department of Defense Policy Directive (1975).
21. A typical service regulation states that "[m]embers involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who cannot be tolerated in a military organiza
tion. . . . Their prompt separation is essential." SEC. NAV. INST. 1900.9A.
See also note 3 supra.
22. M.C.M. chs. IV & XXVIII; 10 U.S.C. §§ 802-803 (1976). All members of the armed forces are subject to the U.C.M.J. and may be tried by
court-martial for any offense made punishable by the code. See id.
23. The administrative discharge procedure is speedier and procedurally
simpler than the trial-like court-martial. See Everett, Military Administrative
Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 DUKE L.J. 41, 96; Rivera, supra note
2, at 838. Generally, it seems that courts-martial are selected in sexual preference cases only where there is also an allegation of a serious crime, such as
rape. See, e.g., United States v. Coronado, 11 M.J. 522 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981)
(Air Force Captain accused of homosexual rape of soldier).
24. benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 969 (E.D. Wis.
1980), quoting Army Regulation 135-178, Chapter 7-5(b)(6). Compare id.
with A.F.R. 39-12, supra note 3.
For an overview of general military discharge procedure, see Matlovich v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For a different
perspective, see E. BOGGAN, supra note 11, at 43-60.
25. Rivera, supra note 2, at 841. Review is usually sought on the basis
of substantive constitutional grounds, such as: the impropriety of certain treatment based on a person's status; the protection of consensual adult acts by
the right of privacy; the requirement of a "rational nexus" between behavior
and the reasons for discharge, and the first amendment right of association.
Id. at 841-42.
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homosexuality, but instead premised their challenges on procedural due
process grounds. 26 Since 1973, however, direct attacks by admitted
homosexuals on the constitutionality of the services' regulations and
27
policies have become more frequent.
In Doe v. Chaflee,28 a seaman voluntarily disclosed to naval authorities that he was involved in a homosexual relationship with a shipmate. 29 The seaman was assured that, because of his excellent record,
he would receive a general discharge; however, the Navy gave him an
undesirable discharge. 30 He then petitioned the Board for Correction
of Naval Records for correction of his discharge, but was frustrated by
administrative delays in the process of application. 3 ' The seaman then
petitioned for a writ of mandamus to set aside the undesirable discharge
and for "correction . . . of his discharge to either an honorable or

general discharge." 32 Although the court dismissed the action, it held
that an undesirable discharge for homosexual acts could be set aside as
arbitrary and capricious, unless the service officials could demonstrate a
nexus between an individual's homosexual activity and the quality of
88
his military service
Attacks on the services' regulations since Chabfee have become more
pointed, questioning not the type of discharge granted, but rather, the
very ability of the armed services to discharge individuals on the basis
of non-disruptive homosexual activities. 34 Prior to 1980, many questions
26. Rivera, supra note 2, at 841. See Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d
226 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (Air Force discharge of enlisted woman for homosexuality
invalid where she received no pre-discharge hearing, was not informed of
specific charge against her, and all evidence submitted at hearing was favorable to her).
27. Rivera, supra note 2, at 837-55.
28. 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
29. Id. at 113.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 114. During the litigation, the Navy, pursuant to a previous
application by plaintiff, upgraded plaintiff's discharge to a general discharge,
whereupon plaintiff asked the court for an honorable discharge. Id.
33. Id. The court then proceeded to find a nexus in petitioner's own disclosure statement which became a part of his military record. Id. at 115.
In his statement, petitioner revealed that the problem and tensions caused by
his relationship with his shipmate "had made and would continue to make

the performance of his official duties difficult if not impossible."

Id.

34. See Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974). In this
case, two seaman apprentices were discharged for allegedly engaging in consensual homosexual activity while off duty at their off base apartment. Id.
at 980-81. Plaintiffs sought not to upgrade their discharges, but to have their
discharges set aside on the grounds that the Navy policy, "as it relates to
private consensual homosexual conduct between adults is void . . . because
it is in violation of the . . . constitution." Id. The court did not reach the

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss2/2

6

Deiter: Employment Discrimination in the Armed Services - An Analysis of

1981-82]

COMMENT

about the services' discriminatory regulations and policies had been
raised, but the case law had provided few answers. The policies of all
three services have since been subjected to rigorous examination,
culminating in three decisions of major importance in 1980.35
The first of these decisions was rendered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in benShalom v.
Secretary of the Army.36

In

benShalom, the plaintiff challenged the

constitutionality of the "status" section of the Army's homosexual regulations.3 7 This section mandated the discharge of any soldier who
considered himself a homosexual, even though that person engaged in
no homosexual acts whatever.3 8 The benShalom court framed the issue
as "whether petitioner can be discharged from the Army (even if the
discharge is 'honorable') simply because she is a homosexual, although
there is no showing that her sexual preferences interfered with her
abilities as a soldier or adversely affected other members of the
Service." 39 The court held that petitioner could not be so discharged,
and found the Army regulations unconstitutional on three grounds:
1) they infringed on Ms. benShalom's first amendment rights as well as
chilling all soldiers' first amendment liberties; 40 2) they violated Ms.
constitutional issue, however, vacating and remanding on the ground that the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies..
Consideration of the constitutionality of the services' discriminatory policies has been thwarted by the court's order to remand for exhaustion of administrative remedies in numerous cases. See, e.g., Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980) (petition for declaratory and injunctive relief
to enjoin the Army from permanently discharging plaintiff held in abeyance
until honorably discharged servicemember exhausts administrative remedies);
Heisel v. Chalbeck, 405 F. Supp. 361 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (petition for injunction
to prevent involuntary discharge denied, pending exhaustion of postdischarge
administrative remedies).
35. See benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (Army regulations found unconstitutional); Matlovich v. Secretary of
the Air Force, 23 F.E.P. Cases 1251 (D.D.C. 1980) (Air Force unable to justify
its regulations concerning homosexuality); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp.
192 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (Navy regulations and policy arbitrary and capricious
as applied to plaintiff), rev'd sub nom. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of benShalom, see notes 36-42 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Matlovich, see notes 43-58 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Saal (Belier), see notes 59-65 and ac-

companying text infra.

36. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
37. Id. at 967. Ms. benShalom was a reservist instructor at the Fourth

Brigade Drill Sergeant Academy. Id. at 969. At various times during her
training she acknowledged that she was a homosexual, but there was no indication that she had engaged in homosexual acts or had ever made a homosexual advance toward female reservists. Id.
38. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
39. 489 F. Supp. at 969.
40. Id. at 973-74. Tracking the language of the regulation, the court said
it could "see no detrimental effect on any legitimate military interest caused
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benShalom's privacy rights under the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments by infringing on her "right to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as one's personality, self-image, and indeed, one's very identity"; 41 and
3) they abridged her rights to substantive due process under the fifth
amendment by allowing her to be discharged as "unsuitable" when,
despite her homosexuality, she was suitable for military service in every
42
other respect.
In Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,48 the court considered an
Air Force regulation mandating discharge for homosexual acts.4" The

petitioner, Technical Sergeant Matlovich, a homosexual,4 attempted to
by a soldier who merely 'evidences' a 'tendency, desire or interest' in most
anything, including homosexuality." Id. at 974. Therefore, in balancing
Ms. benShalom's first amendment rights against the needs of the military, the
court concluded that "First Amendment interests carry the day...." Id. at
975. For an analysis of the benShalom court's method of balancing individual
rights against the needs of the military, see notes 80-83 and accompanying
text infra.

41. 489 F. Supp. at 975, citing Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The court said,
"[tlhe privacy of the integral components of one's personality-the essence of
one's identity-this court believes, is an interest so fundamental or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty' as to merit constitutional protection." 489 F.
Supp. at 975, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
42. 489 F. Supp. at 977. The court noted that, despite her homosexuality,
plaintiff's extensive service record indicated that her performance was not
only suitable, but exemplary. Id. Therefore, the court concluded it was
arbitrary and capricious to conclude that she was other than a "suitable"
soldier. Id.
43. 13 E.P.D. 11,325, rev'd and remanded, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
on remand, 23 F.E.P. Cases 1251 (D.D.C. 1980).
44. 13 E.P.D.

11,325, at 6088.

45. 591 F.2d at 853. Matlovich submitted a letter to the Secretary of the
Air Force in which he declared he was a homosexual, and asked that an exception be made to the usual policy of discharging homosexuals. Id. On appeal, the court noted that prior to sending the letter, Matlovich had had a
most
commendable highly useful service in the military over a long period of time, starting with the Air Force in 1963. . . . Here is a man

who volunteered for assignment to Viet Nam, who served in Viet
Nam with distinction, who was awarded the Bronze Star while only
an Airman First Class, engaged in hazardous duty on a volunteer basis
on more than one occasion, wounded in a mine explosion, re-volun-

teered, has excelled in the Service as a training officer, as a counseling

officer . . . and has at all times been rated at the highest possible
ratings by his superiors in all aspects of his performance, receiving
in addition to the Bronze Star, the Purple Heart, two Air Force

Commendation Medals and a Meritorious Service Medal.
Id. The letter initiated an investigation followed by involuntary administrative discharge proceedings, resulting in Matlovich's discharge from the Air
Force on October 22, 1975. Id. at 854.
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have the sections of the Air Force regulations mandating discharge for
homosexual acts declared unconstitutional on privacy and equal protection grounds. 46 The initial trial court decision rejected the constitutional arguments on the basis of cases which the trial court interpreted
as holding that there existed no fundamental right to engage in homosexual activity. 47 The trial court therefore narrowed the issue to
whether the honorable discharge of Sergeant Matlovich was arbitrary
and capricious48 and applied the deferential rational relationship test
to the regulation. 49 The trial court concluded that the Air Force had
a legitimate interest in assuring full readiness for combat, protection of
recruitment, security of military information, and overall efficiency, and
therefore, the Air Force regulation at issue was not so irrational that it
could be branded arbitrary and capricious. 50 Therefore, the district
court "reluctantly" granted summary judgment in favor of the Air
51
Force.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia vacated the district court decision. 52 However, the court of
appeals did not reach the constitutional issue. 53 The court noted that
the Air Force regulations specifically provided for the retention of
46. 13 E.P.D. 11,325, at 6088.
47. Id. The district court relied primarily on two cases, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), and Singer v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd 429 U.S.

1034 (1977).

13 E.P.D.
11,325 at 6088. However, the year after the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court decided Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977), casting significant doubt on this interpretation of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. See note 53 infra. Similarly, Singer was later reversed.

See 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).

48. 13 E.P.D.
11,325, at 6089.
49. Id. The trial court noted that due process required the plaintiff to
show that there was no rational relationship between the regulations dictating
dismissal, and any legitimate state interest. Id. The court opined that judicial scrutiny in cases involving the Armed Forces was especially narrow since
the appellate court required "undue deference to the judgments of the military." Id. The court therefore felt obliged to accept and apply this narrower
standard of review. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id. The trial court felt that the Air Force position in this case was
a "knee jerk" reaction based on outdated sexual stereotypes. Id. Although
the trial court concluded that the Air Force regulations were sufficient to
withstand legal attack, it found the result "distressing," an example of a "bad
case" making "bad law." Id. The trial court's comments are cited at length
in note 137 infra.
52. 591 F.2d at 855.
53. Id. The government argued that the question of whether private
homosexual acts between consenting adults was constitutionally protected was
answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 591 F.2d at 855. The court noted however,
that the Supreme Court had later said that the issue was still open. Id., citing
Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (1977).
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homosexuals "in the most unusual circumstances," and that the Air
4
Force had in the past retained homosexual members on active duty.1
The court was disturbed because it found it "impossible to tell on what
grounds the Air Force refused to make an exception or how it distinguished this case from ones in which homosexuals" were retained.5
The court therefore vacated and remanded the case to allow the Air
Force to explain why it refused to retain Sergeant Matlovich on active

duty.56
On remand, the district court found that the Air Force was "totally
unable in any way to clarify or explicate its position on discharge and
retention of homosexuals either generally or as applicable to Plaintiff
Matlovich." 5 The court further found that because there was in fact
no satisfactory standard in existence, the discharge of Matlovich was
unlawful. 58
54. 591 F.2d at 853 n.1.

See A.F.R. 39-12, § H,

2-103 b; note 3 supra.

55. 591 F.2d at 855.
56. Id. at 857. The court required that the Air Force provide an indication of the grounds for its exercise of discretion "so that the court [could]
decide if it was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful in exercising its discretion
whether or not to retain Matlovich." Id.
57. 23 F.E.P. Cases at 1252. The court, in a blistering opinion, charged
"that the Air Force, either through a total breakdown in its own communications or by an intentional trifling with the legal process, .has misled two courts
and confused the issues in this long, drawn-out case." Id. at 1251.
58. Id. at 1252. The court declared plaintiff's discharge void ab initio,
ordered his immediate reinstatement with full back pay and seniority, and
ordered that a copy of the court's order be included in his personnel records.
Id.
In response to this adverse decision, the Department of Defense promulgated new temporary regulations designed to close the gap that the services
perceived the Matlovich case had opened. D.O.D. Directive 1332.14, 46 Fed.
Reg. 9571 (1981) (to be codified in 32 C.F.R. Part 41). The prefatory comments to the new regulations admitted that "various court decisions raised
questions with respect to separation of servicemembers on the basis of homosexuality." Id. The comments explained why the D.O.D. rushed the new
regulations into print: "because of the overriding importance of providing the
Military Departments with clear guidance on this issue, it was determined
that revision of those procedures relating to homosexuality should be promulgated without waiting for publication of the complete revision of the Directive." Id.
The thrust of the new regulations is to eliminate the broad discretionary
language upon which the court focused in the Matlovich case, and to narrow
the circumstances under which an individual who has engaged in homosexual acts may be retained in the service. Id. at 9577-78. Under the new
regulations, such an individual may be retained only if a board of officers finds
that:
1) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual behavior; and
2) such conduct is unlikely to recur; and
3) force, coercion, or intimidation was not involved in the conduct; and
4) the member's continued presence in the service is consistent with
good order, discipline, and morale; and
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The final significant decision of 1980 was rendered by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Beller v. Middendorf.59
In Belier, an enlisted woman in the Navy with a fine performance
record, was prevented from re-enlisting because of her admitted homosexual relationship with another enlisted woman.60 She brought suit,
contending she was deprived of due process of law by the Navy regulations which rendered her ineligible for re-enlistment.6 '
The trial court found that the Navy regulations, at least as applied
to the plaintiff, were arbitrary and capricious and violative of her fifth
amendment due process rights. 6 2 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the "importance of the government interests furthered
and ...

the relative impracticability . . . of achieving the Government's

goals by regulations which turn more precisely on the facts of an individual case, outweigh whatever heightened solicitude is appropriate for
consensual private homosexual conduct"-at least where the employer
is the Navy.63: Conceding that the rule was harsh, and perhaps irrational, 64 the court nevertheless felt that the peculiar needs of the
5) the member does not desire or intend to engage in homosexual
acts in the future.
Id. at 9578. The basic purpose of the regulation was to reaffirm the D.O.D.
policy "that homosexuality is incompatible with military service." Id. at
9571.
59. 632 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1980).
60. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192-94 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff, after admitting during an investigation that she had consensual homosexual relations
with another enlisted woman, was processed, for separation. 427 F. Supp. at
194. During this processing period, her enlistment expired, and she was
given a re-enlistment code designating her ineligible for re-enlistment. Id.
Even during this processing period, her performance continued to be outstanding as evidenced by her final Evaluation of Performance for the period
I Mar.-31 Jul. 1975:
AIRMAN SAAL is in training on the Ground Control position and
progressing well. She studies very well on her own and always prepares herself thoroughly for each step in training. Under close observation AIRMAN SAAL shows good judgment and foresight on
Ground Control while maintaining composure. Quite well liked,
AIRMAN SAAL always enhances the positive attitude her work group
strives for. AIRMAN SAAL is always smartly dressed and presents a
fine example of today's enlisted woman. Highly recommended for advancement and reenlistment.
Id. at 204. During her period of enlistment, Airman Saal had six other
evaluations, all of the same positive tone. Id. at 203-04.
61. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
62. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub
nora. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
63. 632 F.2d at 812.
64. Id. at 808 n.20. The court, however, was unconcerned that the Navy
policy "may be irrational as applied in particular cases," reasoning that "the
general policy of discharging all homosexuals is rational." Id. at 812.
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military, and the Navy in particular, made the rule constitutional in
this case.6
III. ANALYSIS
A. Discharge for Homosexual Status
Of the three cases decided in 1980, only the benShalom case squarely
addressed the issue of discharge for homosexual status.68 None of the
Matlovich series of decisions addressed the "status" issue, since they were
concerned primarily with discharge for homosexual acts. 7 Although the
Beller case was also concerned with a discharge because of homosexual
acts, the court appeared to accept as given the unconstitutionality of
discharge based on sexual preference. 68
If the benShalom court has correctly stated the law, it would follow
that at least some aspects of the services' sex-preference discharge policies
can no longer be enforced. Those policies which mandate the discharge
of persons merely because they might exhibit homosexual tendencies,
desire, or interest69 seem clearly unconstitutional under benShaloln.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to concentrate in detail upon the benShalom
reasoning.
The benShalom court was inclined to give the military " 'the widest
possible latitude' in the administration of personnel matters," 70 but
65. Id. at 810-12. The court emphasized that the fact that the Navy was
the employer was "crucial to our decision." Id. at 812. The court's primary
concern could be the unique requirements of peacetime sea duty. Id.
66. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. The relevant language
concerning homosexual status under the newly issued regulations reads as follows: "A member shall be separated under this section if . . . 2) The mem-

ber has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual ......
46 Fed. Reg.
at 9577-78 (1981). For the origin of the new regulations, see note 58 supra.
67. See notes 43-58 and accompanying text supra.
68. 632 F.2d at 808 n.20. The Ninth Circuit noted the requirement in
benShalom that the military show that the particular plaintiff is unfit for
continued employment before the government could discharge that individual,
and opined that benShalom was a proper case to require such a showing. Id.
69. For the original Army language at issue, see note 24 and accompanying
text supra. For the homosexual "status" language of the new D.O.D. regula-

tions, see note 66 supra.
70. 489 F. Supp. at 970. The benShalom court found the services' regulations reviewable, despite the fact that "most decisions as to the composition,
training, equipping, and control of the Army are beyond judicial review"
and that "strong policies compel the courts to give the military the 'widest
possible latitude' in the administration of personnel matters." Id. at 970,
citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d
197, 199 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl.
1979).
However, the court consistently refused to allow the Army to hide behind
the talisman of "the 'peculiar' nature of military life," requiring instead that
the service provide some evidence of an actual connection of relationship between the soldier's sexual preference and the military interests to be protected.
489 F. Supp. at 972.
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the disputed regulations were nonetheless unable to. withstand judicial
72
'
review. 71 Although the court could find no property or liberty interest,
the court stated that it would reinstate plaintiff if the restrictions on her
first amendment rights could not be justified.73 The court found that
the first amendment protects soldiers as well as civilians, 74 even if the
different character of the military might require a different application
of those protections.7 5 The court then directed courts to inquire
whether military conditions actually dictate a different application of
first amendment principles to members of the military.70 Since. the
Army was unable to offer any proof to support its claim that retention
of homosexuals like Ms. benShalom would be detrimental to its
mission," the court concluded that there was no adverse effect on any
legitimate military interest.78 Therefore, the benShalom court found
that the need to protect the first amendment interests of the plaintiff
predominated.Th

71. See notes 72-88 and accompanying text infra.
72. 489 F. Supp. at 971-72.
73. Id. at 973.
74. Id. at 972, citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). In
Perry, the Court stated:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made dear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may
not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionality protected interests-especially, his interest
in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to
a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited. This would allow the government to .'produce -a result
which [it] could not command directly'. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible .... We have applied the principle
regardless of the public employee's contractual or other claim to a
job.
408 U.S. at 597 (citations omitted).
75. 489 F. Supp. at 973. The benShalom court noted that "while members
of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the first amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of those protections." Id., quoting
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
76. 489 F. Supp. at 973. See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). In Carlson, the court balanced the legitimate military need against
the limitation on the plaintiff's first amendment rights. Id. at 1331-33. The
Carlson court noted that "[t]o strike the proper balance between legitimate
military needs and individual liberties we must inquire whether 'conditions
peculiar to military life' dictate affording different treatment to activity arising
in the military context." Id. at 1331 (citations omitted).
77. 489 F. Supp. at 973.
78. Id. at 974.
79. Id. at 974-75.
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The Army regulations in benShalom failed to pass constitutional
muster on privacy grounds as well.8 0 The benShalom court recognized
that the law is unsettled as to whether private sexual conduct between
consenting adults is protected by the right of privacy,8s and opined that
the "peculiar nature of military life" justified giving the Army substantial leeway in exercising control over sexual conduct while soldiers
are on duty and in the barracks.8 2 However, the court ruled that
constitutional privacy principles clearly protected one's sexual preferences in and of themselves, and the court would not defer to the Army's
attempt to control them without both a showing of actual deviant conduct and proof of a nexus between the soldier's sexual preference and
her military capabilities.ss
Finally, the Army regulation was found to deprive Ms. benShalom
of substantive due process under the fifth amendment.ss Again, the
court stated that for the regulation to be upheld, a nexus had to be
found between the plaintiff's status as a homosexual and her suitability
for service.8s In this case, there was no such nexus-the plaintiff was
discharged as "unsuitable" for service although her actual performance
was not only suitable, but "exemplary." 86 Therefore, the court found
that the regulation, and the Army's conduct based on it, was arbitrary
87
and capricious.
It is submitted that the benShalom court correctly applied a
rational relationship standard of review to the Army's dismissal of
Ms. benShalom. The rational relationship test requires only that the
means selected in the regulation rationally advance a legitimate government, end. However, the constitution is violated if there exists no
relationship. In benShalom the Army regulations failed to pass constitutional muster, not because they were subjected to a high level of
judicial scrutiny, but rather, because the Army was unable to meet the
80. Id. at 975. The benShalom court found that the right of "personal
privacy" meant nothing if it did not "encompass an individual's right to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as one's personality, self-image, and indeed, one's very identity." Id.
81. Id. at 976. The court reached the conclusion that the law was unsettled after comparing Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd 425 U.S. 901 (1976),. with the subsequent statements of
Justice Brennan in Carey y. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5,
& 694 n.17 (1977). 489 F. Supp. at 976. See note 47 supra.
82. 489 F. Supp. at 976.
83. Id. The Army did not even attempt to show that such a nexus existed. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id. at 977. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
86. 489 F. Supp. at 977.
87. Id.
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extremely light burden of showing a rational relationship between its
admittedly legitimate goals and the methods it chose to reach them.8
The benShalom court's two-step "nexus test" provides the military
services with useful guidance as to when it is permissible to regulate a
servicemember's sexual preference,S a standard fairly simple to apply
and review. Where the service can demonstrate that sexual preference
has an adverse effect on military capabilities or performance, it.
is clear
that the court will defer to the services' regulation." Where -no' such
adverse effect can be demonstrated, it is submitted that there is no
justifiable reason for discharging servicemembers solely on the basis of
sexual preference. Therefore, it appears that the benShalom approach
strikes a fair balance, protecting the military services against adverse
impact upon military effectiveness and efficiency, while ensuring sufficient
protection for individual rights.
It is concluded, however, that widespread adoption of the benShalom
analysis might have some adverse impacts on the military. It appears
obvious that to survive meaningful review, the services will have to
develop more extensive factual records in their sexual preference discharge cases in order to justify a discharge. . It cannot be questioned
that this would restrict somewhat the services' flexibility in retaining or
discharging 'personnel, but it may be questioned whether the services
have an interest in discharging competent personnel without justification.
On the whole, it appears that the effect on the individual is so severe,
and the burden on the military so insignificant, that meaningful review
of the services' discharge actions is justified. 91 .
B. Discharge for Homosexual Acts
On the question of discharge for homosexual acts, the guidance
provided by the three cases discussed in part II is not uniform. The
benShalom case offers some support for the view that discharge of a
servicemember for homosexual acts may be an unconstitutional violation
of privacy and first amendment rights. 92 The benShalom court held
that the first amendment protects the manifestations of one's personality, 43 and unless the manifestation occurs on duty or in the barracks,
88. Id. at 976. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
89. It is submitted that such guidance would be equally useful whether
homosexual status or homosexual acts are at issue. For a discussion of this
point, see notes 97-101 and accompanying text infra.
90. 489 F. Supp. at 976. It is dear, for example, that the benShalom
court would defer to service regulations which control sexual conduct while the
servicemember is on duty or in the barracks. Id.
91. The benShalom court found it necessary to weigh similar factors and
arrived at the same conclusion. See id. at 971.
92. See notes 73-83 and accompanying text supra.
93. 489 F. Supp. at 976. "The Ninth Amendment protects the privacy of
one's personality, while the First Amendment protects manifestations of that
personality." Id. See also notes 73-79 and accompanying text supra.
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the Army must show, in addition to the actual "deviant" conduct, a
94
nexus between a soldier's sexual preference and his military capability.
Even though the benShalom court was specifically concerned with homosexual status, nothing in the phrasing of this "nexus test," or in the
-court's analysis, suggests that the test is only applicable to regulations
,concerning homosexual status. On the contrary, the benShalom court's
phrasing of the "nexus test" in terms of conduct rather than status,9 5
and its citation of sexual conduct in the barracks or on duty as examples
of appropriate regulation of sexual preference, suggest that the "nexus
test" is the proper test to evaluate service attempts to regulate homosexual acts as well as homosexual status.96 Thus, in any case where the
service cannot show that the homosexual acts of the servicemember
result in some demonstrable harm to the service, that homosexual
servicemember cannot be discharged.
However, the Ninth Circuit in Belier arrived at the opposite result
after applying a different analysis. 97 The court defined the issue before
it to not involve government regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior. 98 The court stated that it must merely assess a military
regulation which prohibits personnel from engaging in homosexual
conduct while they are in the service.9 9 Since the plaintiff did not make
a claim of deprivation of his right to equal protection of the laws, the
court concluded that it need not address the question of whether con94. 489 F. Supp. at 976.

For a discussion of the benShalom "nexus test,"

see notes 80-87 and accompanying text supra.
95. 489 F. Supp. at 976.
96. Id.
97. For a discussion of the factual background of the Beller case, see notes
59-65 and accompanying text supra. Like the benShalom court, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had no valid property or liberty interest
upon which to base a claim of deprivation of procedural due process. 632 F.2d
at 805-07. For the benShalom court's treatment of this issue, see 489 F.
Supp. at 971-72. The Ninth Circuit, in considering plaintiff's property interests, said that "unless the Navy as a substantive matter may not discharge all
homosexuals, or unless it must consider factors in addition to homosexuality
in its decision . . . we see no basis for inferring any expectation of continued service sufficient to constitute a . . . property interest." 632 F.2d at
805. The Ninth Circuit also failed to find a liberty interest, since "the fact
of an honorable discharge on its face seems to impose no stigma on the recipient." Id.
98. 632 F.2d at 810.

The court found that "Roe . . . and . . . Zablocki

. . . suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private consensual
homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge," requiring
the court to decide "whether there is a right to engage in this conduct in at least
some circumstances," but the court concluded that the Navy regulation prohibiting private consensual homosexual behavior was not one of them. Id.
The court did not suggest what kinds of government regulations would require it to decide the substantive constitutional issue. Id.
99. Id.
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sensual private homosexual conduct is a fundamental right, the regula
tion of which would require heightened judicial scrutiny.100 . . .
In its substantive due process analysis, the Beller court utilized a
rational relationship standard of review.' 0 ' The court held that.-the
nature of military employment was crucial to its decision, stating' that,
although one does not surrender one's constitutional rights upon :entering the military, those rights must be viewed in the light of the. special
circumstances of the Navy. 0 2 The court concluded that, since the Navy
had "multiple grounds" for believing the regulations appropriate for
and since the
the full and efficient accomplishment of its mission,'
Navy's concerns have a basis in fact and are not conjectural, there was
104
reason to sustain the regulation in this case.

I

The Belier case was decided on extremely narrcv grounds. 0 5 It
is submitted that the court went to great lengths to distinguish "military
regulations which prohibit personnel from engaging in homosexual
conduct" from "government regulation of private consensual honosexual behavior." 106 The court also refused to decide any issues
other than the substantive due process issue.' 0 7 Thus, the court was
able to avoid the issue of whether there were in fact any "conditions
100. Id. at 807.
101. Id. at 809-10. Even though the court began its analysis of the case
by placing it "somewhere between [the rational relationship and compelling
state interest] standards," after balancing. the competing interests and finding
the government's more weighty, it nonetheless concluded that 'the rational rela.
tionship, standard was the correct standard with which to review the case.. Id.
at 808-10.
102. Id. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
103. 632 F.2d at 811. The court found four grounds supporting the
regulations: 1) preservation of the fabric of military life; 2) preservation of
the integrity of the recruiting process; 3) maintenance of discipline, and 4)
acceptance of the men and women of the military stationed in foreign countries. Id.
104. Id. at 811-12.
105. See notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra.
106. See note 98 supra.
107. See 632 F.2d at 807.

108. It is submitted that, by avoiding first amendment issues, the court
was able to cite the "rights restrictive" portion of Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974) (constitutional rights for those in the military must be restricted
by the special circumstances of the armed forces; the military is, "by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society") while ignoring the
portion of Parker which requires the military to justify any limitation placed
upon the servicemember's constitutional protections (i.e., that the court must
inquire whether there are in any particular case, conditions peculiar to military
life: which truly require restricting the rights of those, in the military). 632
F.2d at 810-1i. For a further discussion of the use of "rights restrictive". language in Supreme Court opinions, see notes 74-76 and accompanying text
supra. By this analysis, the Ninth Circuit was able to avoid subjecting the
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peculiar to military life" that actually required different treatment of
homosexual activity arising in the military context. 08
. It is also submitted that the court avoided the important issue of
whether the means chosen to regulate homosexual behavior were overbroad. 10 9 Since the regulation was reviewed under a rational relationship standard, the court did not have to concern itself with the "wisdom
of the regulation." 110 It is submitted that the very narrowness of the
Ninth Circuit approach reduces the importance of its contribution to
this area of law since, should a plaintiff make anything other than a
substantive due process attack on discriminatory regulations, the Beller
decision would provide little, or no guidance."' ,
The Matlovich case injects yet another factor into the consideration 112 primarily because it too failed to resolve the constitutional question of whether private consensual homosexual activities between adults
are protected by the Constitution.' 8 The case holds that where a
regulation expressly contemplates exceptions to a general policy of discharging homosexuals, any discharge under the regulation is im-

Navy's regulations to any meaningful review under which, presumably, they
would fail. The Ninth Circuit did not explain why it felt the fifth amendment protections were not, entitled to the same level of scrutiny as first amendment 'protections. See 632 F.2d at 807-12.
109. See 632 F.2d at 812. The district court, in its 1977 opinion, had detailed why the Navy regulation was overbroad:
[T]he particulars specified could in this case be grounds for excluding other persons as well. Thus, "tensions and hostilities" could justify exclusion of members of minorities or other persons who also
may be "despised" by some; disruptive emotional relationships could
exist between male and female Navy personnel justifying exclusion

of women: parents may become concerned over their children associating with Navy personnel who may gamble, use alcohol or drugs or
engage in -illicit heterosexual relations: Persons other than homosexuals may engage in disruptive physical aggression, and fear of criminal
prosecution, social stigma and divorce and the danger of undue influence is a risk created by any form of illegal or antisocial conduct, not
confined to homosexuality.
In other words, the problems which the Navy enumerates to support blanket exclusion of persons who engage in homosexual acts are
problems which are endemic to a heterogeneous society such as the
Navy and with which it deals in the ordinary course of its operations on a case by case basis.
Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 201 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom.
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
110. See 632 F.2d at 812.
111. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
112. For the factual background of the Matlovich case, see notes 43-46and accompanying text supra.
118. 591 F.2d at 855.

See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
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proper 114 unless the service can give a reasonable explanation for".its
failure to make an exception in that particular case.1•The controlling principle, according to the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, is that a service branch must Igive
sufficient indications of the criteria used in the exercise or non-exercise
of its discretion. 11 This, the court noted, would enable the reviewing
court to appraise the decision under the appropriate standard of' review. 117 When, on remand, the Air Force after two attempts was unable
to clarify the standards used in the application of. its discretion, the
district court entered judgment in favor of Sergeant Matlovich- . 8
Assessing the impact of the Matlovich cases on the law of discharge
for homosexual acts is difficult. Soon after the decision adverse, to1the
military in the Matlovich case, the Department of Defense, in an attempt to remove the discretion issue from judicial review,"l9 ordered the
services to change their regulations. As a result of this action, .the
Matlovich decision is unlikely to have a direct impact on future cases.
However, the Matlovich court's requirement that the Air Force show
specific, non-arbitrary reasons for not retaining Matlovich, seems to be
merely another way of stating that the service must. show a nexus
between sexual preference and military performance in order to justify
a discharge for homosexual acts.' 20 This, of course, would be.the -same
114. 23 F.E.P. Cases at 1252.

"Absent standards which can be- evehly.

fairly and objectively sustained and applied throughout the Air Force .

..

the

discharge of Matlovich was improper." Id.
115. 591 F.2d at 855-57. The service in this case is free to formulate
standards by either rule-making or case-by-case decisionmaking. Id. at 861..
116. Id. at 859-61.
117. Id. at 860. Adopting the analysis propounded in the Laird case, the
court pointed out that: 1) where the executive reviewing authority could find
in favor of a claimant, but fails to do so, reasons supported by facts in the
record must be given; 2) the reviewing court must consider only the reasons
given by the executive authority, and not rummage in the record to find
some reason to sustain his determination, and 3) the regulatory requirement
for reasons is meaningful, and is one that cannot be satisfied by a mere recitation of the statutory provisions. Id., citing United States v. Laird, 469. F.2d
773, 779-83, 787 (2d Cir. 1980).
118. 23 F.E.P. Cases at 1252. However, the Ninth Circuit in Belier found
that the discretion exercised by the Secretary of the Navy in retaining a sailor
who would otherwise be discharged for homosexuality, to be less important.
See 632 F.2d at 802-05. Since the type of discretion involved was inherent in
the Secretary's authority and "unrelated to the fitness . .. of 'the particular
individual or the reasons why the Navy discharges homosexuals," rather than
being a specific discretionary provision set forth in the regulations as in Matlovich, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the Secretary's discretion to be an
important factor in the resolution of the case. Id. at 805.
119. 46 Fed. Reg. at 9571 (1981). For a more detailed treatment of the
D.O.D. response to the Matlovich decision, see notes 58 & 66 supra.
120. For a discussion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's requirement that the Air Force show specific non-arbitrary reasons for
not retaining Sergeant Madovich, see notes 112-18 and accompanying text
supra.
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"nexus test" which benShalom requires. 121 While neither Matlovich nor
benShalom are anything more than persuasive authority outside their
respective jurisdictions, it is submitted that their approach is preferable
to the semantic fine tuning engaged in by the Beller court. 122 Therefore, it :is submitted that their analysis is the one that should be followed
in most instances, with the result that the law would require proof of a
nexus between homosexuality and military efficiency before a servicemember can be discharged for homosexual behavior or status.
However, the Belier case indicates how fact sensitive a review of a
discharge for homosexual acts can, and perhaps must, be.123 It is, of
course, possible that a benShalom-type challenge to the Navy regulations
could succeed, but the outcome is uncertain since the Belier court
specifically avoided consideration of discharge for homosexual status. 2 4
On the other hand, it is also possible that some reviewing courts could
find, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the particular service's situation was
factually distinguishable from the usual discharge case so that no "nexus
test" or meaningful review of the service's regulations should be required.125 It is also possible that the service regulations might survive a
benShalom analysis if, under the facts of the particular case, the service
could show the required nexus between the member's sexual preference
and military performance and/or efficiency.
Hence, under the present state of the law, servicemembers will continue to be discharged for homosexual acts because this continues to be
the Department of Defense policy. 26 Whether or not these discharges
will be upheld very likely will depend on the analysis which the court
applies and the facts of each individual case, including perhaps the
branch of the service to which the plaintiff belongs. 27
IV.

CONCLUSION

The cases discussed, although undoubtedly significant, have left the
law in a perplexing state of uncertainty. Under the present state of the
121. For an analysis of the benShalom "nexus test," see notes 80-81 and
accompanying text supra.
122. For an analysis of the Beller court's approach, see notes 105-11 and
accompanying text supra.
123. The Ninth Circuit stressed the importance of the fact that the employer was in this case the Navy. 632 F.2d at 810. For a discussion of the importance of this fact in the court's analysis, see note 65 and accompanying

text supra.
124. The Ninth Circuit seemed to base its decision on extremely
narrow
grounds. See the discussion at notes 105-1 and accompanying text supra.
125. One possible basis for such a factual distinction between services
could be that the Navy requires extended tours of peacetime sea duty. 632
F.2d at 811. See note 65 supra. See also the discussion of the Beller court's
reasoning at notes 105-11 and accompanying text supra.
126. 46 Fed. Reg. at 9571 (1981).
127. This factor seemed to be vitally important to the Beller court. See
632 F.2d at 810 & note 65 and accompanying text supra.
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law, despite service regulations to the contrary, it appears that no
service can legally discharge an individual merely for being a h6mosexual, 28 or even for engaging in homosexual activity, without showing
a nexus between his sexual preference and his lack of military capabilities."' On the other hand, specific, compelling factual situations may
induce a court to avoid meaningful review of a discharge based on sexual
preference, or even enable such a discharge to survive meaningful
review.18 0
This contradictory state of the law has arisen primarily because
none of the cases have resolved, or even reached, the issue of whether
private consensual homosexual activity between adults is protected by
the Constitution.' 8 ' Should the Supreme Court decide that such activity
is constitutionally protected, the law in this area would be greatly
simplified since it is extremely doubtful whether the discriminatory
regulations of any service could survive a level of review requiring
demonstration of a "compelling state interest.' 182 But given the
Supreme Court's uncertainty concerning sexual preference discrimination, an authoritative pronouncement by the Court does not seem likely
18
in the foreseeable future.
It is conceded that the armed services' discriminatory policies are
intended to solve or avoid genuine problems in the military. 8 4 It is
suggested, however, that the current regulations are incapable of providing a solution, because the problems that the services are trying to
reach are not problems caused solely by homosexuals. 8 5 Rather, the
problems of decreased military efficiency and morale caused by disruptive and anti-social sexual behavior exist regardless of whether they
are caused by heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual servicemembers." 36
128. Discharge for homosexual status is discussed at notes 66-91 and accompanying text supra.
129. The impact of the cases on the law of discharge for homosexual acts

is discussed at notes 92-127 and accompanying text supra.

130. See notes 123-27 and accompanying text supra.
131. Typical of the approaches of the cases so far decided, is the treatment
of the constitutional issues by the District of Columbia Circuit. See'591 F.2d
at 855.
132. None of the services, despite many opportunities, and some attempts,
have been able to show that a nexus exists between sexual preference and military capabilities. The Army did not even try to show that such a nexus existed. See note 68 supra. The Air Force failed in two attempts to show such
a nexus. See 23 F.E.P. Cases at 1252. The Navy, when provided with a
similar opportunity, "was either unable or unwilling to do so." 632 F.2d at
804 & n.13.
133. It is submitted that the Supreme Court seems to be unable or unwilling to definitively rule on the issue. See note 53 supra.
134. The Beller court noted that-the Navy's "concerns have a basis in fact
and are not conjectural." 632 F.2d at 811.
135. See the district court's analysis in Saal, at note 109 supra.
136. Id.
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It is submitted that the proper way to eliminate disruptive behavior
in the military is, as Judge Gesell suggested in Matlovich,x s 7 through
carefully tailored regulations specifically directed in a non-discriminatory
fashion at the harmful behavior. 18 The legitimate needs of the armed
services and the rights of servicemembers with non-standard sexual
preferences could best be balanced by the replacement of all regulations
which discriminate on the basis of sexual preference with new regulations
and a new policy patterned after the Civil Service Commission's 1975
suitability guidelines. 89 The services have already responded to some
problems caused by disruptive sexual behavior, such as sexual harassment
in the workplace, in just such a non-discriminatory fashion. 14o
It is further suggested that the services incorporate the benShalorn
"nexus test" into their new regulations.141 By ensuring that no service137. At the conclusion of the first Matlovich case in 1976, Judge Gesell
addressed the following statement to the Air Force:
This is a distressing case. It is a bad case. It may be that bad cases
make bad law.. Having spent many months dealing with aspects of
this litigation, it is impossible to escape the feeling that the time has
arrived or may be imminent when branches of the Armed Forces need
to reappraise the problem which homosexuality unquestionably presents in the military context.
The Services are admittedly involved in matters of immediate and
clear importance. They not only have problems with respect to performing the obvious military task but there are moral, religious and
privacy overtones that cannot and should not be overlooked.
We all recognize that by a gradual process there has come to be
a much greater understanding of many aspects of homosexuality.
Public attitudes are clearly changing. Some state legislatures have
already acted to reflect these changing public attitudes moving more
in the direction of tolerance. Physicians, church leaders, educators
and psychologists are now able to demonstrate that there is no standard, no preconceived stereotype of a homosexual which unfortunately,
some of the Air Force knee-jerk reaction to these cases would suggest
still prevails in the Department.
The Armed Forces have been in many ways leaders in social experimentation and in their adaptability to changing community standards .

.

.

.

Here another opportunity is presented.

While the

Court has reached its conclusions, as a judge must do, on the law,
I hope it will be recognized that after months of intense study of
the problem, matters within and without the record, the Court individually, for what it is worth, has reached the conclusion that it
is desirable for the military to reexamine the homosexual problem to
approach it in perhaps a more sensitive and precise way.
13 E.P.D. 11,325 (D.D.C. 1976).
138. Id.
139. Fed. Personnel Manual Supp. 731-1, subch. 53-2(3)c.

See note 1

supra.

140. See A.F.R. 30-2, ch. 5 (1981); Interim Message Change (I.M.C.) 81-2.
para. IL (8 Oct. 1981).
141. For a description of the benShalom "nexus test," see notes 80-83 &=
92-96 and accompanying text supra.
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member is discharged unless the alleged sexually disruptive behavior
actually had an adverse effect on military efficiency or job performance,
the service would protect both the individual's rights, and itself against
the loss of valuable personnel.1 42 Incorporation of this standard into
the new regulations would also provide the services with the knowledge
14
that their discharges would survive judicial review in most instances. a
It is submitted that incorporating the suggestions outlined in this
comment would allow the services to promulgate effective new regulations which would ensure the discipline and order essential to an
144
effective military, while also protecting individual liberty.
Lawrence R. Deiter
142. Incorporation of this requirement into the new regulations should
present the services with little difficulty, since they already use a similar requirement in other administrative discharge actions. For example, in discharging an airman for a personality disorder under A.F.R. 39-12 (the same regulation under which discharges for homosexuality are presently brought), the
Air Force must demonstrate to a board of officers 1) that it is a disorder diagnosed by medical personnel, and 2) that it interferes with the member's ability

to adequately perform his duties. A.F.R. 39-12, §A,

2-4 (1972). There seems

to be little reason to expect that the nexus test would by any more difficult
to apply in cases of discharge for disruptive sexual behavior than in cases
of discharge for personality disorder.
143. Since the benShalom nexus test represents the most stringent standard yet applied by courts reviewing military discharges based on sexual preference, it would seem reasonable that service attempts to ensure that the nexus
is present before discharging a member would greatly enhance the chances of

the discharge being upheld upon review.
144. benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. at 974, citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
'Captain, United States Air Force. Captain Deiter is presently an assistant Staff judge Advocate at McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento,
California. This comment was written while Captain Deiter was a staff member on the Villanova Law Review.
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